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Swartz: Compulsory Legal Measures and the Concept of Illness

COMPULSORY LEGAL MEASURES AND THE
CONCEPT OF ILLNESS
Louis H. SwARTz"
I. IN

ODUCTION

We meet during a time when three modes of governmental
efforts to deal with problem behavior and human problem conditions are in much ferment. I have in mind (1) criminal law
and treatment of offenders, (2) civil commitment laws and programs, and (3) non-compulsory social welfare measures. Although I will not be able to deal in detail with this third category, for us to maintain a proper perspective in considering
compulsory measures, we must keep non-compulsory alternatives
well in mind. Indeed, Dr. Myerson has already dealt in specific
terms with the matter of non-compulsory measures, reporting
here detailed results of a long-term voluntary program for alcoholics in Boston.'
This paper discusses some of the implications of expanded
concepts of mental health and mental ill-health or disorder for
both the criminal and civil law. One need only to point to a
few recent developments to demonstrate the relevance of recently
extended notions of illness for the law relating to compulsory

measures.
In Robinson v. CaZifornia2 in 1962, the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that a statute making it a misdemeanor to
be a narcotic addict was contrary to the eighth amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. The court
stated clearly, however, that states might properly apply civil
commitment provisions to addicts. 3 In my own state, New
York, a statute for the mandatory civil commitment of narcotic
*Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo

School of Law.
1. Myerson, The Treatment of Alcoholism: A Physician's View, 19 S.C.L.
REv. 332 (1967), a reprint of D. J. Myerson & J. Mayer, Origins, Treatment
and Destiny of Skid-Row Alcoholic Men, 275 NFw ENG. J. MED. 419 (1966).
2. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The California Health and Safety Code § 11271,
under which defendant had been convicted, made it a misdemeanor, punishable
in no case by less than 90 days in jail, "to be addicted to the use of narcotics."
3. "California appears to have established just such a program in §§ 53505361 of its Welfare and Institutions Code. The record contains no explanation
of why the civil procedures authorized by this legislation were not utilized in
the present case." Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665 n.7 (1962).
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addicts for an indeterminate period up to three years, or in
some cases up to five years, has just gone into effect. 4 The
Robinson case also raised questions concerning what behavior
associated with being a narcotic addict, such as use or possession
of narcotics by addicts, might also be placed outside the criminal
law and be reachable only through other modes of legal control.
It left open, too, the question of what other patterns of maladjustment or poor mental health, regarded by many physicians
as illness and by many legislators as crime, might be treated in
similar fashion by the court.
Last year two federal courts of appeals, relying in whole or
in part on Robinson, decided that a chronic alcoholic may not
be convicted of the offense of public intoxication. These were
the Driver5 case in North Carolina, and the Easter" case in the
District of Columbia. In Driver,the court clearly expressed the
view that civil commitment might be used by the state. In
Easter,the District of Columbia already had commitment legislation of several years standing to which the court referred in
its opinion," but which had never become operational because of
public failure to provide the legally required facilities. These
cases also raised questions of a much broader nature concerning
the extent to which aggressive or annoying behavior contrary to
the provisions of criminal law might in the case of the chronic
alcoholic be inappropriate for penal sanctions.
"Recognition" of addiction as disease is a recent development. 9
It was only in 1956 that the American Medical Association recognized alcoholism as a disease, that is to say, a condition hospital administrators should regard as warranting admission to
4. N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE: LA-,v §§ 200-213 (McKinney Supp. 1966) (commitment provisions effective April 1, 1967).
5. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). See 18 S.C.L. Ray.
504 (1966).
6. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
7. "Of course, the alcohol-diseased may by law be kept out of public sight."
Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966). "[N]othing we have said
precludes appropriate detention of . . . [the chronic alcoholic] for treatment
and rehabilitation so long as he is not marked a criminal." Id. at 765.

8. D. C.

CODE

ANNx. §§ 24-501-514 (1961). See Easter v. District of Colum-

bia, 361 F.2d 50, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Certification that proper and adequate
treatment facilities had been provided as required by law had not been made,
hence the commitment provisions had not gone into effect. Id. at 51 n.3.
9. See, e.g., Lindesmith, Introduction, in JOINT CoMIrrrEE OF AMER. BAR
Ass'N & AMER. MEnIcAL Ass'N, DRUG ADDICTOIN: CRIME OR DIsEAsE? vii-viii

(1961).
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the hospital. 10 One can readily see by referring to the "KrystalMoore Discussion", a recent illuminating exchange of views in
the Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol," that although
there is consensus that properly qualified physicians may treat,
and should treat, alcoholics, there is considerable divergence of
views even among medical men as to whether alcoholism is a
disease, and also as to whether any but certain medical specialists are qualified to deal with the problems of alcoholism.
I see alcoholism as a violation of conduct norms, norms against
drinking "too much". 2 A wide variety of people drink too
much; and some may be mentally ill in the more conventional
sense. Most are not. Violation of conduct norms, whether concerning drinking, using narcotics, stealing or assaulting others,
would in my view not, of itself, constitute disease. 18 In some
cases such violations may be accompanied by disease, just as disease may accompany conformity to and non-violation of social
and legal conduct norms.
Traditionally, disease has meant the disturbance of some subdivision of total human functioning, such as respiration or cognition, rather than total human functioning or conduct. 14 Indeed
Dr. Myerson's explanation to this audience of his own view that
alcoholism is not a disease was based on this ground, referring
specifically to one of the notable versions of this position,
10. See Hospitaliation, of Patients with Alcoholism, 162 J.A.M.A. 750
See also Fox, Alcoholism in 1966, 123 Aas. J. PSYCHIATRY 337
(1966):
It has taken 20 to 30 years of persistent effort by the National Council
on Alcoholism, Alcoholics Anonymous, the Rutgers (formerly Yale)
Center of Alcoholic Studies, the Christopher D. Smithers Foundation,
and the North American Association of Alcoholism Programs to change
the public image of the alcoholic . . . from that of a worthless, weakwilled skid row derelict to that of a worthwhile person suffering from
an illness which can be successfully arrested so that he (or she) can take
his rightful place in society-a good parent, good spouse, good neighbor,
good worker, and a productive citizen with a social conscience.
11. Krystal & Moore, Who Is Qualified to Treat the Alcoholic? A Discussion, 24 Q. J. STUDrs ON ALCOHOL 705 (1963) ; Comments, 25 Id. 347, 558
(1964) ; 26 Id.118, 310, 506 (1965).
12. See, e.g., Fox, A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Treatment of Alcolohisn, 123 Ams. J. PSYCHIATRY 769, 770 (1967) :
Alcoholism is a behavioral disturbance in which the excessive drinking
of alcohol interferes with the physical or mental health of the individual.
13. See Swartz, "Mental Disease": The Groundwork for Legal Analysis and
Legislative Action, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 389, 404, 414-16, 420 (1963).
14. See Lewis, Health as a Social Concept, 4 BPIT. J. SOCIOLOGY 109, 117-18
(1953) ; Swartz, "Mental Disease": The Groundwork for Legal Analysis and
Legislative Action, 111 U. PA. L. Rav. 389, 404 (1963).

(1956).
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namely, Virchow's dictum that all disease must be traced to
pathology in the cell. 15
However, we are attempting in this paper to describe certain
social views. The expanded concept of illness or poor mental
health, which is our main subject, is at odds with the view just
expressed by the writer and expressed also by Dr. Myerson.
We lawyers have a great need for structure and definiteness.
We like to "tangle" with something solid-a statute, cases, a
specific fact situation, either as found by a competent tribunal
or as stated hypothetically. One need not be surprised, therefore,
that we show reluctance to embark on discussions of social attitudes, cultural norms, expectations and beliefs, even though we
admit their possible relevance to the resolution of legal problems. Yet, it seems to me that these informal and often somewhat vague facets of social reality are just as important to understand, when we talk about compulsory measures under the
criminal law and the law of involuntary civil commitment, as
other social facts for which we think we have "hard" reliable
statistical data-the number of crimes committed, the amount of
property damage involved, the number of arrests made, the clinical findings of physicians, and so on.
Thus, I aim this paper at the analysis of some aspects of
social reality which I believe we should better understand when
considering the future shape of compulsory legal measures as
they relate to a wide range of types of "problem" behavior, including the excessive drinking behavior of the chronic alcoholic.
I wish to call attention to two related developments. The first
is the harnessing of the prestige of science to value preferences in
the form of mental health frames of reference. Second is the
increased social tendency to resolve problems of norm violation
with the aid of mental health frames of reference. In conclusion
I refer to the need to work out legal principles adequate to the
challenges posed by these developments.
15. Comments to Myerson Speech, 19 S.C.L. REv. 347, 348 (1967).
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VALUE PEFERENCES AS MENTAL HEALTH

Kingsley Davis, 16 Barbara Wootton, 7 Thomas Szasz,18 and
others'0 have each in his own way called attention to the contemporary translation of morals into the language of mental
health. This translation has been explained on the ground that
traditional sources of moral authority-namely, religion and
custom-have become much less powerful in their ability to
command allegiance, their ability to move men to action, and
their ability to fulfill men's desire for an emotionally and intellectually satisfying basis for the "rightness" (legitimacy) 20 of
social value systems.
Disguising its valuational system (by means of the psychologistic position) as rational advice based on science,...
[mental hygiene] can conveniently praise and condemn
under the aegis of the medico-authoritarian mantle. 21
Davis pointed out thirty years ago that mental hygiene (more
recently called mental health) has taken over the dominant class
ethic, namely, the Protestant ethic, "as the unconscious system
of premises upon which its 'scientific' analysis and its concep22
In keeping with this
tion of mental health itself are based."1
16. Davis, Mental Hygiene and the Class Structure, 1 PSYCHIATRY 55 (1938).
17. Wootton, Sickness or Sint?, 159 TWENTIETH CENTURY 433

(1956);

Wootton, The Law, the Doctor, and the Deviant, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 197 (1963).
18. T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBRTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963), passim.

19. See Swartz, "Mental Disease": The Groundwork for Legal Analysis and
Legislative Action, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 389, 403-09 (1963).
20. The meaning of legiti-nacy as used in this article is illustrated, in other
contexts, in N. GROSS, W. MASON & A. MCEACHERN, ExPLORATIOx

ANALYSIS (1958).

IN ROLE

See, e.g., id. 248: "A legitimate expectation is one which

the incumbent of a ...

position feels others have a right to hold. An illegiti-

mate expectation is one which he does not feel others have a right to hold."
Sociological discussions of legitimacy usually build upon the treatment of the
subject by Weber. See Rheinstein, Introduction, in MAX WEBER ON LAW IN
ECONOMY AND SOcIETY xxxix-xl (Rheinstein ed., transl. by Rheinstein & Shils,
1954).
21. Davis, Mental Hygiene and the Class Structure, 1 PSYCHIATRY 55, 65
(1938).
By the psychologistic approach is meant the explanation of human conduct in terms of traits originating within the individual, as over against
traits originating within society... [P]sychologism is a means whereby
an unconsciously held ethic may be advantageously propagated under
the guise of 'science'. It protects the hygienist from a disconcerting fact
-the relativity of moral judgments.
Id. at 60.
22. Davis, Mental Hygiene and the Class Structure, 1 PSYCHrATRY 55, 56
(1938).
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interpretation, a psychiatrist defines health according to the
"physical and mental processes which seem to be desirable to the
system in power." 23
Thus in an age when the prestige of science is high, some have
in large areas of human conduct avoided explicit talk about
values, and have spoken instead in terms of health and illhealth, good adjustment and poor adjustment-as if they were
referring to empirical facts rather than to covert moral norms.
Preferences about right conduct, and statements concerning the
range within which groups are willing to tolerate noncomformity, have been disguised, and have been put forth dressed in the
white laboratory coat of medical science. Speaking of the
mental hygienist, Davis observed: "[I]is social function is not
that of a scientist but that of a practicing moralist in a scientific, mobile world."2 4 Or as Lady Wootton puts it: "The medical profession has... inherited the mantle of the church in an
age in which profound religious conviction is exceptional and
intimations of immortality are seldom taken seriously." 2 5
The expanded concept of ill health is, of course, not just an
academic matter. People take action in accord with the concept
by bringing a great range of their problems to psychiatrists.2 6
23. Inasmuch as health is defined in each culture in terms of those physical

and mental processes which seem to be desirable to the system it; power,
the American concept of health can be derived from that which will be
said about the American culture as a whole. To be able to compete and to
successfully grasp the opportunity which equality provides for the indidual defines the essential meaning of living in America. In order to do
these things, an American citizen must be strong, self-reliant, independ-

ent, free of physical disease, able to get along in a group, ready to adapt
to emergencies, capable of caring for children and the family, and not
a public liability. The healthy individual is expected to use his power for
his own benefit with restraint and wisdom.

Ruesch, Communication and Mental Illness: A Psychiatric Approach, in
RuEscH & BATESON, COmmUNcATioN 71-72 (1951) (emphasis added).

24. DAVIS, Mental Hygiene and the Class Structure, 1 PsYcHITRY 55, 65
(1938).

See also Wootton, The Law, the Doctor, and the Deviant, 2 BRiT.

MED. J. 197, 202 (1963) :

[I]t is reasonable, as the supernatural sanction of moral systems fades, to
seek an identification of morality and mental health. As a personal and

social goal health has much to commend it. It is in harmony with science,

and science is in harmony with the age. Besides, failure to achieve the
goal of health evokes pity and sympathy: failure to attain virtue merely

provokes censure. Goodness, too, is often priggish: health never. So if
we once owed it to God to be good, we now owe it to science to be

healthy.
25. Wootton, The Law, the Doctor, and the Deviant, 2 BRIT. Ma. J. 197,
202 (1963).
26. See, e.g., Swartz, "Mental Disease": The Groundwork for Legal Analysis
and Legislative Action, 111 U. PA. L. Rxv. 389, esp. 399-401 (1963).
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Even apart from taking action about one's own problems, or
those of his family, people are more aware of the mental health
frame of reference, and are more likely to perceive the "prob27
lems" of others as illness.

III.

RESOLVING PROBLENIS OF NOr

VIOLATION WITH THE

AID OF MENTAL HEALTH FRAmms OF REFEmENCE

Any basic discussion of the criminal law and of punishment
(treatment of offenders) 2" in modern times starts with a reference to widespread social criticism and doubts concerning these
institutions. Thus Wechsler says:
[I]n no other area of law have legal purposes and methods
been subjected to a more sustained and fundamental criticism emanating from without the legal group-especially
the psychological and social sciences-but buttressed also

from within.
The challenge is, in substance, that the penal law is inef29
fective, inhumane and thoroughly unscientific.
A conflict or strain has developed between certain cultural
norms and the norms of the traditional institution of criminal
punishment. Norms having to do with rationality (especially
efficiency and effectiveness), 3° the application of science to
27. "Persons who a generation ago would hardly have been thought of as
mentally ill or mentally disabled are today perceived even by policemen and
jailers as 'sick people', a perception with ramifications throughout the criminal
process." A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: Is Co MUNITY MENTAL HEALTH AN ANSWER? 2 (Research Contributions of the
Amer. Bar Foundation, No. 2, 1967).
28. On the matter of definition and terminology concerning the modem institution of "how we deal with offenders," see Swartz, Punishment and Treatment of Offenders, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 368 (1967).
29. Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HAIv. L. REv. 1097,
1102-03 (1952) (footnotes omitted). Hart, Prolegonienon to the Principles of
Punishment, 60 ARiSTOTELuAN Soc. PROC. 1 (1959): "General interest in the
topic of punishment has never been greater than it is at present and I doubt
if the public discussion of it has ever been more confused."
30. More clear cut than many other problems of social control is the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the criminal law in dealing with the chronic
alcoholic offender. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMISISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADIINISTRATION OF JusTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 235 (1967) : "The criminal justice system appears ineffective to deter
drunkenness or to meet the problems of the chronic alcoholic offender."
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human affairs, 31 the value of the individual life, and antipathy
to the conscious infliction of suffering upon others, have made
it increasingly difficult to legitimate punishment. Traditional
moral values, with respect to notions of right and wrong, have
also undergone great change and are in a considerable state of
uncertainty. One aspect of this moral uncertainty is that there
is less conviction that an individual can be considered responsible for what he does in the clear-cut "old-fashioned" sense of the
32
terms responsibility and blameworthiness.
Nevertheless, there would appear to be strongly felt social
demands for legal institutions which will perform, approximately, certain of the functions we have traditionally associated with
criminal law and punishment, namely: (a) normative definition
31. In modem societies purely moralistic or legal interpretations of delinquency appear unsatisfactory and out of tune with the scientific ethos of
the times. If it can be determined that the offender is sick, his deviance
is at least made explicable in principle, like other diseases, although
there may still be some undiscovered 'virus'.
V. Aurn T, ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGY 145 (1967).
32. See W. MOBERLY, RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1951); Hart, Prolegomenon to
the Principles of Punishment, 60 ARISTOTELIAN Soc. PRoc. 1 (1959).
Speaking of the modem "crisis in valuation", Karl Mannheim notes that a
conflict of philosophies exists in every major aspect of modem life, including
the treatment of criminals. "We hesitate whether to treat the law-breaker as
a sinner or as a patient, and cannot decide whether he or society is at fault."
K. MANNHEIM, DIAGNOSIS OF OuR TIME 13 (1943).
"[I]n an increasing number of instances in modern society there is dispute
over whether 'criminality' or 'illness' has led to a particular behavior sequence." V. Aubert & Messinger, The Criminal and the Sick, 1 INQUIRY 137,
138 (1958).

One might note also that some of the humane recent recommendations of the
President's Commission may indirectly contribute to the increased blurring of
the moral distinction between criminal and civil (or indeed between criminal,
civil and voluntary) measures. PaESIENT'S COMMISSION oNq LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FRE
SocIETY 133-34 (1967) (Italics added.):
Procedures are needed to identify and divert from the criminal process
mentally disordered or deficient persons. Not all members of this group
are legally insane or incompetent to stand trial under traditional legal
definitions ....

It is more fruitful to discuss, not who can be tried and

convicted as a matter of law, but how the officers of the administration
of criminal justice should deal with people who present special needs and
problems. In common prosecutorial practice this question is, and the
Commission believes should be, decided on the basis of the kind of correctional program that appears to be most appropriate for a particular
offender. The Commission believes that, if an individual is to be given
special therapeutic treatment, he should be diverted as soon as possible
from the criminal process. [The Commission recommends] early identification and diversion to other community resources of those offenders
in need of treatment, for whom full criminal disposition does not appear
required.
Id. 134.
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of some conduct as seriously unacceptable; (b) vigorous expression of social disapproval of such conduct, including also the
venting of feelings of hostility which exist concerning norm violators who harm or annoy us by engaging in such conduct;
(c) deterrence of potential norm violators; (d) incapacitation
or segregation of some troublesome norm violators; (e) rehabilitation of norm violators to the extent possible without too great
economic cost or social inconvenience; (f) reassurance of the
public that adequate measures are being taken to preserve order
and safety.
Modern thinldng has changed in various ways and degrees,
with respect to the view, formerly widespread, that (1) we the
public have a duty to punish the offender for his offense, 33 and
that (2) the offender (a) deserves to be punished for his offense, and (b) for his own sake ought to desire punishment as a
means of expiation. 34 Thus, under the historic or traditional
view, punishment in whatever form and for whatever ends-as
prescribed at the time-was mandated by social norms that laid
down, in theory at least, complementary obligations on the part
of both society and the offender.
We do believe, however, that sick people (a) ought to be
treated, and (b) ought to seek and cooperate with competent
33. Against the doubt as to whether the state has any right to punish at all,
[the retributive, expiratory or retaliatory] theory maintains it to
positive moral duty. . . . Kant . . . expressed an undoubtedly
be
wide sentiment when he urged that we could not regard a world as
moral if in it virtue went unrewarded or sin unpunished.
Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YA.x L.J. 987, 1009-10 (1940).
Shoham provides the following translation of a well-known passage from
Kant: "[E]ven if civil society should dissolve with the consent of its members ... the last murderer found in prison must first have been executed, so
that each may receive what his debts are worth." S. SHOHAM, CRME: AN )
SOCrAL DEVIATION 36 (1966) (detailed citation therein).
34. Dostoevsky passionately believed that society was morally justified in
punishing people simply because they had done wrong; he also believed
that psychologically the criminal needed his punishment to heal the laceration of the bonds that joined him to his society. So, in the end, Raskolnikov the murderer thirsts for his punishment. Many of us here today
-perhaps most of us-may hate these ideas .... [Yet] In an attenuated
form they still have a place among the now complicated and partly inconsistent set of ideas that jostle together in the mind of an English
judge when he sentences the criminals convicted in his court.
H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND THE ELIMINATION OF RESPONSIBILITY 4
(1962).
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help in getting well, 35 and further that we the public should not
allow sickness in the community to go untreated, untended.
Thus, under the contemporary view, widely shared in modern
society, treatment of the sick is mandated by social norms that
lay down complementary obligations in this direction on the
part of both society and the sick individual.
The limited but important parallel I am suggesting between
legitimation of traditional punishment of the offender and modern treatment of the sick is now almost complete. Traditionally,
the offender "deserved" punishment. Today, as well as historically, the sick person "deserves" treatment, and is "in need of
help." However, this parallel yet lacks one element of crowning
importance-that of legal compulsion.
Where because of his ill health the sick person cannot appreciate or effectively act upon knowledge of the fact that he is sick
and needs competent help in getting well, (a) the obligation of
various people around him, and the obligation of the community
at large, to furnish competent help to him becomes greater, and
(b) the use of coercion in furnishing care and treatment to the
sick person becomes legitimate ("right," "proper") to the extent
that it is necessary to protect others or the sick person himself
35. The socially institutionalized expectations of others with respect to the
sick person, which tend also to be his expectations of himself, have been
termed the "sick role".
There seem to be four aspects of the institutionalized expectation system relative to the sick role. First, is the exemption from normal social
role responsibilities, which of course is relative to the nature and severity
of the illness ...
The second closely related aspect is the institutionalized definition that
the sick person cannot be expected by "pulling himself together" to get
well by an act of decision or will. In this sense also he is exempted from
responsibility-he is in a condition that must "be taken care of." His
"condition" must be changed, not merely his "attitude." Of course, the
process of recovery may be spontaneous but while the illness lasts he
can't "help it."..
The third element is the definition of the state of being ill as itself
undesirable with its obligation to want to "get well." . ..
Finally, the fourth closely related element is the obligation-in proportion to the severity of the condition, of course--to seek technically competent help, namely, in the most usual case, that of a physician and to
cooperate with him in the process of trying to get well ...
T. PARsoNs, THE SocrAL SYSI
436-37 (1951). See also Parsons, Illness
and the Role of the Physician: A Sociological Perspective, 21 Am. J. ORTHoPSYCHIATRY 452 (1951); Parsons, Definitions of Health and Illness in the
Light of American Values and Social Structure, in E. G. JAco, PATIENTS,
PHYSICIANS AND ILLNESS 165 (1958).
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from serious harm because of his ilHness.3 6 It is a role obligation
of the sick person to seek competent help and cooperate in getting
well. Where he is incapacitated by his illness itself from doing
these things-witness the harm, to himself or others, that is
imminent or has already occurred (as a result of his alcoholism,
his narcotic addiction, his sex deviance, his psychopathy, etc.)
due to his failure to seek or obtain adequate help for his illness
-then, under some circumstances at least, others must provide
the "help" to him on an involuntary basis.
For convenience we can give labels to the different modes of
legitimating public use of coercion in the case of some norm violators, as briefly described above. The traditional set of norms
and values we will call the wrongdoing-punishment model. To
the extent that belief in these elements of the historic legitimation of punishment has weakened or disappeared entirely, a new
and somewhat functionally equivalent belief has either reinforced the weakened older belief or has replaced it. The new
belief, applicable to compulsory measures under both the criminal law and recent laws of civil commitment, might be called
the illness-involuntarycare model. In modern times the wrongdoing-punishment model and the illness-involuntary care model
both employ the highly flexible word treatment. In one case the
word is used to refer to treatment of offenders; in the other to
treatment of patients, psychopaths, sociopaths, addicts, etc.
We now find the illness-involuntary care model informally
superimposed over the wrongdoing-punishment model as a supplementary, or alternative, rationalization of the criminal law
institution of treatment of offenders.3 7 We will also find the
36. See, e.g., Parsons, Illness and the Role of the Physician: a Sociological
Perspective, 21 Air. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 452, 457 (1951): "This conception
of lack of responsibility leads to the justification of coercion of the insane,

as by commitment to a hospital." Parsons distinguishes between the sick role
and the role of the insane, but does not elaborate upon the differences, which
would make a very interesting subject for analysis.

37. [T]he idea of reform was in the beginning conceived of as a moral
change, a conversion or a gradual moral enlightment. Solitary confine-

ment was introduced with the rationale that it would give the criminal a
chance to repent ....It was inevitable, however, with increasing secularization and rationality that the process of reform should be viewed as
a question of improvement or recovery in more ethically neutral terms.

The analogy with the sick was near at hand and probably the only one
available.
V. AUnSRT, THE HIDDEN Socmry, 44 (1965).

[Un a society where science is used to make predictions and control the
future in ever increasing areas of life, the lack of predictability of the
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illness-involuntary care model applied to certain categories of
norm violators and violations separated from the criminal law
38
and placed in the civil law.
For some lawmakers seeking greater incapacitation than the
conventional wrongdoing-punishment model allows, there is a
willingness to designate certain troublesome categories of offenders as "pathological" in some substantial sense that diffenentiates them from "ordinary" offenders, and to provide greater
security through civil measures or special correctional measures
for these.3 9 Belief in the soundness of the criminal law may in
general remain undiminished or may perhaps even be strengthened because of the above exception, or parallel structure,
created.
The illness-involuntary care model accommodates well our
conflicting feelings about what public steps to take concerning
those who harm or annoy us. What conflicting feelings about
treatment of norm violators are we talking about, and how does
the illness-involuntary care model resolve these conflicts? Two
specifics, using the individual as a means, and purposely inflicting pain, may suffice for purposes of illustration.
A. Using an individual as a means
We shrink from ordering the individual against his will or
regardless of his consent to sacrifice his life, or any substantial
part of his life, for the social good. (The conscription of men
into the armed forces, and their assignment to combat, are extracriminal's future behavior cannot easily be tolerated ....
[The definition
of the criminal as sick] brings his deviant behavior into the scope of
comprehensive theories, whose predictions are based upon a biological and
psychological model of man. In principle, the behavior of the offender
appears now to be predictable.
Aubert & Messinger, The Criminal and the Sick, 1 INQUIRY 137, 151 (1958).
38. See, e.g., Logan, May a Mat; Be Punished Because He is Ill?, 52
A.B.A.J. 932, 934 (1966), quoting principles agreed to at the National Conference on Legal Aspects of Alcohol and Alcohol Use, held June, 1965, at

Swampscott, Massachusetts, under the aegis of the Boston University LawMedicine Institute: "[After establishment of adequate facilities,] alcoholics
should be directed to treatment. Those who fail to respond to treatment should
not continue to be subjected to arrest procedures, but should be provided an

institutional environment for as long as necessary" (emphasis added).
39. Examples are the sex psychopath laws, see F. LiNDmAxN & D. McINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DisABIan AND THE LAw, ch. 10 (1961), and the one day
to life sentence for certain sex offenders, as provided by N. Y. PENAL L.
§§ 690, 2010.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss3/9

12

Swartz: Compulsory
Legal Measures
and the Concept[Vol.
of Illness
LAW REVLEw
SoUTH CAitoLINA
19
ordinary but well-institutionalized exceptions to this.) 40 Thus
we shrink from depriving a man of years of his life through
imprisonment as a direct means (individual prevention) or an
indirect means (general prevention)41 of promoting the wellbeing of others, namely, ourselves.
On the other hand, the illness model as well as the "rehabilitative ideal",4 2 permits us to accept compulsory expenditure of a
portion of the individual's life where a major aim is said to be
that of benefiting the individual himself. Of course, he is "benefited" according to our notions of benefit rather than his own.
B. Purposely inflicting pain
We shrink from the fact that compulsory measures cause pain
to those to whom they are applied. The pain results from deprivation of liberty, including physical confinement, loss or
reduction of personal autonomy, loss of privacy, and loss of
many of the satisfactions of free life. The pain in addition may
include the harshness of institutional life, or (for those on probation or parole) the painful threat of being sent or returned to
an institution, and possibly the pain of some specific effort
applied by others to the individual to make him change in the
direction they desire.
We shrink from deliberately inflicting pain on an individual
as a way of making him better, or, as a way of using him to
make others better. Thus we shrink from intentionally inflicting the pain of imprisonment as a device for inducing lawabidingness in the individual himself or in others.
The illness-involuntary care model, however, as well as the
incapacitative-rehabilitative aim,43 posits health or rehabilitation as the goal. Such care or correction is defined as not "hurting" the individual. Perhaps this is because the production of
40. Compare the analogy expressed by Justice Holmes:
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have
hanged (or electrocuted) I should say, I don't doubt that your act was
inevitable for you but to make it more avoidable by others we propose to
sacrifice you to the common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier
dying for your country if you like. But the law must keep its promises.
HOLMES, HOLMEs-LAsKi LETTERS 806 (Howe ed. 1953), as quoted in PAULSEN

& KADIsH, CnmnvAL LAW

AND ITS PRocxssEs 75 (1962).
41. See, e.g., Andenaes, General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 949 (1966).
42. See F. ALLEN, THE BORDELAND oF CRIMINAL JUSICE 25, 37 (1964).
43. See P. TAPPAN, CRIMIE, JUSTICE AND CoREcTioN 259-61 (1960).
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suffering is definitely excluded as a conscious objective of such
care, even if it is a known accompaniment of it.
Recapitulating, then, the sick role and an expanded concept of
mental disorder or ill-health, involve the following features of
importance for the legitimation of coercive measures: (a) there
is an obligation to help the mentally disordered person, against
his will if necessary, not only for the protection of others, but
for his own good; (b) the treatment and care of such persons
is to be turned over to specialists who will deal with the disordered person by the use of scientific methods; (c) the status
of the mentally disordered is negatively valued, and involves
status-reduction; (d) because of its negative valuation and the
possible loss of liberty involved, as well as the suffering caused
by the "illness" itself, the role of the mentally disordered is to
be perceived as involving discomfort and deprivation; (e) ideas
of proportionality between harm caused and the length of loss
of liberty do not apply; (f) compulsory measures of treatment
do not "hurt" the individual subjected to them.
The sick role and an expanded concept of mental disorder thus
provide a new legitimation of the use of legal compulsion, both
with respect to the criminal law and 44an expanded category of
compulsory measures in the civil law.
IV. CoNCLsUION
In many ways the aspects of reality under discussion do not
make a pretty picture. They indicate the present lack of provision, within mental health frames of reference, for direct
moral discourse.
A basic dilemma of any system of social and legal ordering is
how it shall relate what Pound has called the social interest in
45
the individual life to the social interest in the general security.
This dilemma runs throughout the criminal and correctional law
44. "[W]hereas until lately violations of the social norms that are generally
approved were treated as matters that lay between a man's conscience and the
criminal law, such violations are now more and more commonly held to involve questions of mental health or mental disorder." Wootton, The Law, the
Doctor, and the Deviant, 2 BaiT. MFD. J. 197 (1963).
"If people believe that health values justify coercion, but that moral and
political values do not, those who wish to coerce others will tend to enlarge
the category of health values at the expense of the category of moral values.
We are already far along this road." T. SzAsz, LAW, LaBmmY AND PSYCHmTRY 6-7 (1963).
45. See Pound, The Rise of Socialized Criminal .ustice, 10 Cian & DE-

475-79 (1964); Pound, The Juvenile Court in the Service State,
10 CanE & DELiNQuENCy 516, 520 (1964).
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and the civil law of involuntary commitment. Pressures in favor
of both of these interests in our society are very strong.
Existing balances between these interests have been placed in
doubt by the weakening of traditional moral frames of reference
and the increasing popularity of mental health frames of reference. The rise of the latter presents the possible occasion and
opportunity for renegotiating institutionalized definitions of,
and ways of dealing with, problem behavior and problem people.
A somewhat analogous, but more limited, movement to renegotiate was forwarded in the late nineteenth century and thereafter
by the Italian criminological positivists and their followers. 4 6
The crucial challenge concerning institutional changes probably does not lie in the substantive value preferences of mental
health frames of reference, for here in spite of a strong tendency
toward conformity we find flexibility and, indeed, indeterminacy. The potential of psychoanalysis for justifying both conventionality and unconventionality is a partial illustration of
the point. These frameworks use a somewhat unfamiliar and
evolving grammar which can be manipulated to reach a wide
variety of conclusions. Much more substantial and enduring difficulties, however, lie in an increased tendency to make unwarranted assumptions as to existing knowledge, resources, and
practical capabilities, 47 the masking of values as scientific fact,
and a tendency by means of a benign rhetoric to cover over the
morally problematic aspects of the use of compulsion.
III POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 23 (1959):

mands or desires .

.

"Social interests are claims or de. thought of in terms of social life and generalized as

claims of the social group."
I share the basic point of view so well stated by Professor Allen. "[T]he
central problem of the criminal law is and will remain political in character.
It is the problem of achieving the objectives of public order through the use of
power so regulated as to preserve and nourish the basic political values." F.
ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

viii (1964).

46. The deterministic position [of the late nineteenth century Italian positivists] . . . called for a system of criminal prophylaxis ....
The 'state
of danger' of the criminal was to be the decisive criterion in selecting the
appropriate method of dealing with him. Since the appropriate response
of society to dangerousness was not punishment but defence, the very

term punishment, paradoxical as it might seem, should be expunged from
all penal codes. In its place there should be a network of measures of
social defence, elastically conceived to serve the purposes of reformation, cure, incapacitation or even elimination, as the case might require.

L. RADZINOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 55 (1966).
47. "[T]he values of individual liberty may be imperiled by claims to knowl-

edge and therapeutic technique that we, in fact, do not possess and by our
failure to concede candidly what we do not know." F. ALuMN, THE BORnLAND OF CRIMINAL JusTcE 37 (1964).
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